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DEFAMATION LAW OF WISCONSIN
JAMES PATRICK BRODY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article is intended to provide an overview of the law
of defamation in Wisconsin.' The law of defamation, which
has experienced significant changes in the past two decades,
principally because of federal constitutional decisions, represents the interface between significant conflicting claims of
right - on one side, the right of the individual to protect his
reputation and on the other side, the right of persons to speak
freely. Protection of the former right is obviously desirable,
but if it is carried to an extreme and chills communication, it
has an adverse effect on the quality of society. The courts and
legislatures have tried to strike a balance by reasonably defining defamation, recognizing various privileges and constitutional rights and imposing certain preconditions to suit.
In order for defamation to be actionable, the communication must be defamatory of the plaintiff, it must be false and
there must be publication to a third party. At least in some
situations, there must be some degree of fault on the part of
the communicator, and at least in some situations, damages
can be recovered only if there is actual harm. Privileges, absolute or conditional, may protect the communicator from liability even though he has published false and defamatory words.
* Partner, law firm of Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; B.S., University of
Wisconsin; L.L.B., University of Wisconsin.
1. The Marquette Law Review has asked me to survey the law of defamation in
Wisconsin. Because the subject is broad, it is not possible in this space to include all
subjects or discuss fully those subjects which are included. An effort has been made
to make reference at least to the principal subjects. I have tried to present an objective view of the law. However, the reader should be informed that I principally represent media defendants in this field and have appeared in some of the cases discussed as attorney for a party or for an amicus curiae.
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How THEY DIFFER

A. Definition
Generally "libel" relates to publication of written or printed
defamatory words or defamation embodied in physical or
other relatively permanent form. "Slander" relates to spoken
words and transitory gestures.2 Words are, of course, the common vehicles for defamation, but physical conduct sometimes
serves as defamation.3
Which law governs radio and television? The Wisconsin
Supreme Court once noted the question (regarding radio) but
did not have to answer it, 4 and it has never been decided by
our court.
B. Difference in Exposure
Depending on the nature of the defamation, damages may
be harder to establish in slander than in libel. No recovery can
be had for slander unless "special damages" are pleaded and
proved. There are, however, four types of slander which do
not require such proof: imputation of certain crimes, or imputation of a loathsome disease, or allegations affecting one's
business, trade, profession or office or imputation of unchastity to a woman. If the slander fits one of those categories, no
special damages need be shown.
For many years, special damages had to be pleaded in
some libel suits too, but that requirement as to libel was removed in 1962 in Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp.6 The
court said that under the common law rule, which the court
adopted,' damages to reputation were presumed from the

2. See generally

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 568 (1977); W. PROSSER,

112 (4th ed. 1971).
3. See Starobin v.INorthridge Lakes Dev. Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 287 N.W.2d 747,
750-51 (1980), where the defendant's conduct was considered as the basis for a libel
action. At what point in time does transitory conduct (slander) become sufficiently
persistent to be libel? See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 comment
d (1977).
4. Singler v. Journal Co., 218 Wis. 263, 268, 260 N.W. 431, 433 (1935); see also
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §

supra note 2.

5. Starobin v. Northridge Lakes Dev. Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 287 N.W.2d 747, 752

(1980).
6. 15 Wis. 2d 452, 460-61, 113 N.W.2d 135, 139 (1962).
7. Id.
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publication of the libel itself.8 As discussed below, under recent United States Supreme Court decisions, damages may
not be presumed against a defendant who is protected by
those decisions, nor punitive damages awarded, unless the
publication is made with "actual malice," which is with knowing or reckless disregard for the truth. Damages must be
proved unless actual malice exists, but they may include elements other than out-of-pocket loss.9
III. WHAT Is DEFAMATORY? WHEN Am How Is DEFAMATION
TESTED?

A. Definition of Defamation
Words may be critical, unfavorable and insulting without
necessarily being defamatory. Nor are they defamatory merely
because they have damaged the plaintiff.10 In order to be defamatory, words must have a certain quality and meet certain
specific tests.
The older cases defined a libel as:
language which imputed the commission of certain crimes or
tended to degrade or disgrace a person generally or to subject one to public distrust, ridicule, or contempt in the community where he had been regarded in high confidence and
esteem; or, as language which tends to bring the plaintiff
into public hatred, contempt or ridicule or imply or be generally understood to imply reproach, dishonesty, scandal or
ridicule.11
In 1966 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a broad
definition. It said, adopting the Restatement test, that a communication is defamatory if it so harms one's reputation "as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him."12 In his
8. Id. at 458, 113 N.W.2d at 138.
9. See Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 659, 318 N.W.2d 141, 152 (1982); Prahl v.
Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 144-46, 295 N.W.2d 768, 777-78 (Ct. App. 1980).

10. "[U]nless the statement is libelous on its face, it is not made so because of the
effect or damage it might have ....
Actual damage does not determine the nature or
character of the cause of the injury." Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 140
N.W.2d 259, 262 (1966).
11. Id. at 275, 140 N.W.2d at 261 (footnotes omitted).
12. Id. at 275, 140 N.W.2d at 261. The court cited RESATEmENT OF TORTS § 559
(1939). See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORT § 559 (1977). After analyzing the three
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treatise, after listing a number of cases in which words were
held not defamatory, Dean Prosser noted that in those cases
the language might support some other causes of action but it
"lacks the element of personal disgrace necessary for defamation; and the fact that the plaintiff finds it unpleasant and
offensive is not enough." 13
B.

When Is Defamability Tested?

Resolving the threshold question of whether the words in
suit are capable of a defamatory meaning is a function of the
trial court.1" It "is generally raised on demurrer [now motion
to dismiss]."1 If the words are not capable of a defamatory
meaning, "that ends the matter"; 6 the motion to dismiss
must be sustained. If the words are capable only of a defamatory meaning, the motion must be denied; likewise, if they are
capable of either a defamatory or a nondefamatory meaning, a
jury question is presented as to which1 7 way the statement was
understood by the reader or listener.
In holding that a jury question is presented if a statement
is capable of defamation, even though the statement also has
one or more innocent meanings, Wisconsin has taken a harsher position toward the libel defendant and has delegated
more to the jury than has a neighbor state. Illinois, conversely
to Wisconsin, has applied an "innocent construction" rule. If
allegedly libelous words are capable of being read innocently,
they must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter
of law, 8 and questions of innocent construction are for the
allegedly libelous statements, the court ruled they were not capable of a defamatory
meaning.
13. W. PRossER, supra note 2 at § 111.
14. Hoan v. Journal Co., 238 Wis. 311, 329, 298 N.W. 228, 236 (1941).
15. Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 461, 113 N.W.2d 135, 140
(1962).
16. Lathan v. Journal Co., 30 Wis. 2d 146, 151, 140 N.W.2d 417, 420 (1966).
17. Starobin v. Northridge Lakes Dev. Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 287 N.W.2d 747, 75152 (1980); Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 259 N.W.2d 691, 693
(1977); Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 275-76, 140 N.W.2d 259, 261 (1966).
18. John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 877 (1962). The innocent construction rule has been justified on the ground of
"encouraging the robust discussion of daily affairs [citation omitted] as well as of
reducing litigation." Dauw v. Field Enters., Inc., 78 IM.App. 3d 67, -, 397 N.E.2d
41, 44 (1979); see also Fleck Bros. Co. v. Sullivan, 385 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1967).
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court, to be decided as a matter of law.1 9
C. How Is the Test Applied?
In every defamation suit, plaintiff, in order to have a jury
issue, must show that the words involved, either expressly or
by implication, were capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, like other courts, has recognized the need for a threshold at the courthouse door and
over the years has developed a practical rule of reason. The
test of capability of a defamatory meaning is not whether, by
ingenuity, or stretch of the imagination or semantics, or by
considering an extreme possibility, the words might be defamatory. Rather, the determination to be made is whether the
language used "is reasonably capable of conveying a defamatory meaning to the ordinary mind and whether the meaning
ascribed by plaintiffs is a natural and proper one. ' 20 The
words charged as libelous "must be construed in the plain and
popular sense in which they would naturally be understood."2' 1 The words must be "reasonably interpreted. ' "" The
court will not give words a "strained" or "unnatural construction."2 3 The words cannot be read alone, out of context. The
entire writing must be considered.2 ' Circumstances are also
relevant: "[T]he words must be reasonably interpreted and
must be construed in the plain and popular sense in which
they would naturally be understood in the context in which
they were used and under the circumstances they were
2' 5
uttered.
Under those tests, in many cases, words have been found
to be not capable of defamation as a matter of law, even
though some literally possible definitions or inferences might
arguably have demonstrated a possibility of defamation. If the
19. Valentine v. North American Co., 60 IlM.2d 168, 171, 328 N.E.2d 265, 267
(1974).
20. Meier v. Meurer, 8 Wis. 2d 24, 29, 98 N.W.2d 411, 414 (1959) (emphasis
added). See Luthey v. Kronschnabl, 239 Wis. 375, 1 N.W.2d 799 (1942).
21. Leuch v. Berger, 161 Wis. 564, 571, 155 N.W. 148, 151 (1915) (emphasis
added).
22. Meier v. Meuer, 8 Wis. 2d 24, 29, 98 N.W.2d 411, 414 (1959).
23. Puhr v. Press Publishing Co., 249 Wis. 456, 461, 25 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1946).
24. Schoenfeld v. Journal Co., 204 Wis. 132, 235 N.W. 442 (1931).
25. Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 276, 140 N.W.2d 259, 261 (1966) (emphasis
added). •
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test were one of mere "possibility," defamatory meanings
could be read into the most innocuous of words. This would
have a chilling effect on communication, not only by the media, but in business and everyday private dealings. Undue defamation litigation and exposure to damages would occur.
It is sometimes argued by plaintiffs that a "possibility"
test be applied in order to give the complaint a "liberal" construction. In some old cases and in three recent cases where
the defamatory meaning of allegedly libelous words was challenged on demurrer or motion to dismiss, the Wisconsin Supreme Court briefly noted the general rule that pleadings are
to be construed liberally.2 However, the court in so saying has
never abandoned the "reasonable" tests discussed above. In
each of the three recent cases, the court referred to "reasonable" inferences or whether communications were "reasonably"
understood to be defamatory.27 In Denny v. Mertz2 5 the Wisconsin Supreme Court said it had been held that a fact question arises in libel cases "where more than one meaning for a
word [i.e., defamatory or nondefamatory] was possible," but
the case it quoted in support of that statement dealt with an
article the court had said could be defamatory if it "could [so]
reasonably be construed. '29 The court in Denny also talked of
the understanding "reasonable people in the community"
would have of the allegedly libelous word.30 Other cases (not
involving defamation) recently cited by the court for the general rule of "liberal construction" of complaints also require
26. Starobin v. Northridge Lakes Dev. Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 287 N.W.2d 747, 750
(1980) (claims other than defamation were also involved); Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc. 81 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 259 N.W.2d 691, 693 (1977); Schaefer v. State Bar, 77
Wis. 2d 120, 122, 252 N.W.2d 343, 345 (1977). See also Woods v. Sentinel-News Co.,
216 Wis. 627, 629-30, 258 N.W. 166, 167 (1935).
27. Starobin v. Northridge Lakes Dev. Co., 94 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 287 N.W.2d 747 751
(1980); Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 1, 5-6, 259 N.W.2d 691, 693
(1977); Schaefer v. State Bar, 77 Wis. 2d 120, 124-25, 252 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1977). See
also Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 663, 318 N.W.2d 141, 154 (1982), where the
court considered the understanding of the words "reasonable people" would have.
28. 84 Wis. 2d 654, 659, 267 N.W.2d 304, 307 (1978) (citing Lathan v. Journal Co.,
30 Wis. 2d 146, 140 N.W.2d 417 (1966)). The Denny litigation also produced two
later published appellate decisions bearing the same case name: 100 Wis. 2d 332, 302
N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982).
29. 84 Wis. 2d at 659-60, 267 N.W.2d at 307 (quoting Lathan v. Journal Co., 30
Wis. 2d 146, 154, 140 N.W.2d 417, 421 (1966)).
30. 84 Wis. 2d at 655, 267 N.W.2d at 305.
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"reasonable" tests.31

This concept that, while libel pleadings are to be construed
liberally, the court must look to the reasonable meaning of the
words, is not new. In 1935 the court said: "While liberal rules
of pleading are followed in construing a complaint, the
pleader's statement that particular words impute a criminal
charge cannot in themselves enlarge the reasonable and natural meaning of the words used." 2
To adopt a "liberal" rule in defamation cases which does
not incorporate the reasonable-meaning-of-the-words tests
would ignore a significant distinction between defamation
complaints and complaints in most other actions at the motion to dismiss stage. In most other types of actions for tort,
the tort consists of some act or failure to act. It is pleaded by
generally describing those acts or failures. In liberal construction, the courts forgive inadequacies in pleading such descriptions. They do not forgive inadequacies in the evidence, which
is not before them at the threshold pleading stage. Thus,
when the courts liberally construe an allegation of negligence
in an automobile accident case, they are not construing evidence, but a lawyer's brief description of the claim.
On the other hand, in a libel or slander case, the words,
which must be pleaded with particularity," are themselves
the essence of the tort. They themselves are the "evidence,"
and the court is obliged to rule them defamatory or nondefamatory as a matter of law, or "capable" of defamation.
Since it is the court's duty to apply a reasonable, ordinary
meaning to those words, it would seem erroneous to apply a
"liberal" meaning to the words to the extent that it would
31. In Schaefer v. State Bar, 77 Wis.2d 120, 122, 252 N.W.2d 343, 345 (1977), the
court, saying that in liberal construction complainants are "entitled to all favorable
inferences which can be drawn from the facts alleged," cited Rollie Winter Agency,
Inc., v. First Cent. Mortgage, Inc., 75 Wis. 2d 4, 7, 248 N.W.2d 487, 488 (1977), a case
not involving defamation. The page cited referred to "reasonable" inferences. In
Westby v. Madison Newspapers, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 259 N.W.2d 691, 693 (1977),
the court cited an earlier case, Clark v. Corby, 75 Wis. 2d 292, 301, 249 N.W.2d 567,
572 (1977), for the proposition that the court on demurrer "should recognize any reasonable and favorable inferences which support a cause." Clark, also a case not involving defamation, likewise referred to "reasonable" inferences. Id. at 301-02 n.15,
249 N.W.2d at 572 n.15.
32. 216 Wis. at 629-30, 258 N.W.at 167.
33. Wis. STAT. § 802.03(6) (1979).
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mean going beyond an ordinary, reasonable meaning. Conceivably there might be some elements of a libel complaint which
are entitled to "liberal construction" in the popular sense of
the term, but it would seem that the meaning of the words
themselves, which are before the court, must be measured by
an objective scale, not weighted for or against either party.8
Defamation need not be expressly stated in order for there
to be liability. "One may be libeled by implication and innuendo quite as easily as by direct affirmation. One accused of
defamation cannot insist upon a literal reading or his understanding of the language." 5 "Implication" is the understanding which a reader may receive from stated words. As indicated above, the implications must be reasonably drawn.
"Innuendo," also used synonymously with "implication," had
a different technical meaning in common law pleading of defamation. It was the explanation in a complaint of the defamatory meaning of a communication which is alleged to exist in
view of facts not appearing on the face of the publication. The
innuendo was accompanied by a statement of the explanatory
facts called an "inducement." 8
In 1962 the Wisconsin Supreme Court abolished the prior
distinction between libel per se (libelous on its face under
some definitions) and libel per quod (libelous by reference to
extrinsic facts and requiring proof of special damages under
some definitions). 7 Today, the term "inducement" is rarely
heard, and "innuendo" usually only in the sense of "implication." However, some of the basic concepts of those old terms,
although now shorn of artificial pleading requirements, remain valid. Obviously a plaintiff cannot, to resist a motion to
dismiss, read libel into nonlibelous words by alleging (or arguing) a conclusory statement that it implies or means something defamatory if the words do not reasonably support that
meaning, unless some extrinsic facts are alleged which support

34. The court decides whether an article is capable of a libelous meaning. "Where
there is any substantialdoubt as to what the meaning of the alleged libelous publication is, it is for the jury to say whether or not the meaning attributed to the language
used is the correct one." Leuch v. Berger, 161 Wis. 564, 570-71, 155 N.W. 148, 151

(1915).

35. Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 140 N.W.2d 259, 262 (1966).
36. W. PRossER, supra note 2 at § 111.
37. Martin v. Outboard Marine Corp., 15 Wis. 2d 452, 113 N.W.2d 135 (1962).
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the meaning.38
In Schaefer v. State Bar39 the complaint quoted three
statements by the State Bar which the plaintiff alleged to be
libelous; following each, she inserted parenthetically the defamatory meaning she ascribed to the statement (the innuendo). The court found that two of the statements were capable of a defamatory meaning when read in context. However,
notwithstanding and not bound by the plaintiff's alleged defamatory "meaning," it ruled that the remaining statement
40
was not reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning.
Words of defamation need not be such as would damage
plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of an entire community or
even the majority. It is enough that a "substantial and respectable minority" would so react. 41 However, it is not
enough that the communication would be defamatory in the
eyes of a "very small group" not a "substantial minority," or
only in the eyes of people with "peculiar" views; nor even if it
is considered defamatory by a substantial group if its standards are so "anti-social that it is not proper for the courts to
'42
recognize them.
In a Delaware case in 1977,'4 a trial court granted a motion

38. While written in a libel per quod case at a time when special damages had to
be pleaded in such cases, authority quoted with approval by the court in Kassowitz v.
Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 476-77, 277 N.W. 177, 181 (1938), is still
pertinent for
testing the defamation-capability of words:
The general effect of the innuendo is only to explain matter which has been
already sufficiently expressed before; the import of the words used it cannot
enlarge, extend, or change." Likewise, "if the inducement is wanting the deficiency cannot be supplied by the statement of the facts in the innuendo (quoting 17 R.C.L. 396, § 151).
In Luthey v. Kronschnabl, 239 Wis. 375, 378-81, 1 N.W.2d 799, 800, an editorial
said that if plaintiff "'had attended a Christmas Eve service in any one of the Crandon churches we are sure he would have gotten a lot of good out of it and felt a whole
lot better than he did.'" Id. The plaintiff alleged by innuendo that this meant he was
"'a man of such general lack of integrity and Christian virtue as to require the influence of a church service upon him'. . . . "Id. at 378, 1 N.W.2d at 800-01. The court
said the ordinary and natural meaning of the words published was not defamatory
and that the innuendo could not alter the sense or supply a meaning which is not
there.
39. 77 Wis. 2d 120, 252 N.W.2d 343 (1977).
40. Id. at 125, 252 N.W.2d at 346.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 559 comment e (1977).
42. Id.
43. Saunders v. Board of Directors, WHYY-TV, 382 A.2d 257 (Del. Super. Ct.
1978).
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for summary judgment, dismissing the action of a prisoner
who claimed a television station defamed him by calling him
"an alleged F.B.I. informant. ' ' 44 The court said that saying a
person is an informant of a law enforcement agency does not
label him with unlawful or improper conduct, that the "public
contempt" must be in the minds of "right thinking persons"
or among "a considerable and respectable class of people,"
and that plaintiff's reputation in prison, where attitudes depart substantially from the outside, was not the standard for
protection. The court noted that the published statement was
for general consumption by the public and was not directed
specifically to the prison community.
The Delaware case is noted in contrast to the facts and
result in West by v. Madison Newspapers, Inc.," where the
Wisconsin Supreme Court dealt with the attitude of the
Madison community toward charges that plaintiffs were
"spies" (for the federal government), and "paid informants,"
accepting pay to "spy on their neighbors."' 6 The court noted
that the article began with reference to a congressional probe
of federal "snooping," permitting the implication that the
plaintiffs were engaged in reprehensible snooping; and that,
taken in that context and the allegation that the Westbys
spied on neighbors who were accused of nothing more than
political activism, the word "spy" was capable of being defamatory.47 The court distinguished lower court decisions from
foreign jurisdictions, after observing that they were slander
cases and did not involve the publication of words like "spy"
or "paid informant" to the community at large. 48 The court
said that the most important distinction was that they all involved cooperation with authorities against actual lawbreakers. Noting that the neighbors were not even suspected
criminals, the court quoted with approval the trial court's
conclusion that, under existing circumstances, "reasonable
and right-thinking citizens" could take the publication as defamatory. 49 The court did not hold the publication to be de44. Id. at 259.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

81
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Wis. 2d 1, 259 N.W.2d 691 (1977).
at 6, 259 N.W.2d at 693.
at 7, 259 N.W.2d at 694.
at 8, 259 N.W.2d at 694.
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famatory as a matter of law, but said it created a jury issue."0
D.

Opinion

Can "opinion" or "comment" be defamatory? It is clear
that a defamatory expression of fact may not be immunized
merely by labeling it as "opinion," e.g., "In my opinion, Doe
murdered his wife." And it is sometimes difficult to determine
whether a statement is "pure opinion" or is mixed "opinion"
and "fact." But expressions of "pure opinion" do occur, and
the common law developed protection against defamation liability for such opinion on a matter of public interest or concern, known as the right or privilege of "fair comment."
The Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court have referred to this protection as a "privilege,"51 and it will be discussed below in the section on privileges. However, some old authorities have taken the position
that it should not be classed as a "privilege," i.e., an excused
defamation, because opinion or fair comment is not defamation at all.5 2 This position may be supported by the statement
of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,58 that there is no such thing as a "false idea."
In Gertz, the Court, in a statement not necessary to the
decision, said:
We begin with the common ground. Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie
nor the careless error materially advances society's interest
in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public
issues.4
50. Id. at 8-9, 259 N.W.2d at 694.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977); see, e.g., Williams v. Hicks
Printing Co., 159 Wis. 90, 102, 150 N.W. 183, 188 (1914), stating that: "Conditional
privilege as regards newspaper activity does not go beyond fair criticism in respect to

the relations of persons to the public and report of facts."
52. See Thayer, FairComment as a Defense, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 288; Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 203 Mich. 570, -,
170 N.W. 93, 99 (1918).
53. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
54. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
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A number of courts have followed Gertz and seem to have
accepted federal constitutional protection for pure opinion.
Some of the courts have imposed conditions, e.g., that there
be no false implication in the opinion; that the author is privy
to defamatory facts not known to the reader; or, that the facts
on which the opinion is based be known.a The Restatement
position is that an opinion can be defamatory only if the opinion reasonably implies the existence of undisclosed defama56
tory facts.

Wisconsin has not ruled on this issue since Gertz. Wisconsin has ruled that the constitutional protection given the media by Gertz in suits brought by "private" figures for allegedly
false statements of fact does not apply to a nonmedia defendant.57 If Wisconsin or the United States Supreme Court
should rule that the Gertz dictum on "opinion" gives constitutional protection only to opinions by the media, opinions by
private individuals which are the subject of defamation
charges would have to be considered under the Wisconsin
common law privilege of fair comment.
It seems unlikely that the broad dictum in Gertz, which
categorically protects all ideas, would be read to exclude private persons' opinions. Since the Gertz case did not involve
opinions, the Court's statement on opinion was unrelated to
the facts of the case, and was a general pronouncement. According the right to express opinion to all citizens, not just the
media, would also be consistent with the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's statement that "every" citizen has the right to
comment.5
55. See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 834 (1977); Church of Scientology v. Czares, 455 F. Supp. 420, 423-24 (M.D.
Fla. 1978). Louisiana followed the Gertz statement in affording a constitutional defense to charges of defamation for comment in a review of a restaurant, finding that
the facts on which the opinion were based were stated, that the opinion was opinion
with no implication of defamatory facts, that the defendant qualified as "media,"
that the review involved a matter of public interest or concern, and that the statements were made without knowing or reckless falsity. Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d
879 (La. 1977).
56. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
57. Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 660-61, 318 N.W.2d 152-53 (1982).
58. "'Every citizen has a right to comment. . . .'" Grell v. Hoard, 206 Wis. 187,
192, 239 N.W. 428, 430 (1931) (emphasis added) (quoting the rule stated in Arnold v.
Ingram, 151 Wis. 438, 457, 138 N.W. 111, 119 (1913)).
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IV. THE DEFAMATORY WORDS MUST BE PUBLISHED AND
MUST BE DEFAMATORY OF THE PLAINTIFF

A. "Publication"Must Occur
To be actionable for defamation, defamatory words must
be "published" - that is, they must be communicated to a
third party (one other than the person defamed).5 9 The fact
that words are addressed to the person defamed does not defeat publication if they are visible to others, or if they are intercepted by a third person and the sender knew or should
60
have known that such interception was likely to occur.
B. The PublicationMust Identify the Person Defamed
A defamatory article is not actionable unless it identifies
the plaintiff as the subject. It is not necessary that he be
named; it is enough that he be identified by description or
implication. Section 802.03(6) of the Wisconsin Statutes
provides:
Libel or Slander. In an action for libel or slander, the particular words complained of shall be set forth in the complaint, but their publication and their applications to the
plaintiff may be stated generally."'
This statute does not dispense with the need to plead extrinsic facts to show identification of the plaintiff when the
words themselves are so ambiguous as not to reasonably point
to the plaintiff.62 The defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person (plaintiff). 3 The words
"Bank loaned to death by former cashier" were held to be not
59. Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 461-62, 141 N.W.2d 251, 255 (1966).
60. Publication occurred when a libelous telegram was delivered to the telegraph
company for transmission in Monson v. Lathrop, 96 Wis. 386, 71 N.W. 596 (1897); see
also Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 219 (1963) for cases from other jurisdictions, including cases
holding that publication occurred, although disclosure to third persons was by plaintiff, when such disclosure was the natural and probable consequence of the receipt of
such material.
61. Wis. STAT. § 802.03(6) (1979).
62. Downer v. Tubbs, 152 Wis. 177, 180, 139 N.W. 820, 822 (1913), construing
Wis. STAT. § 2677 (1911), comparable to Wis. STAT. § 802.03(6) (1979) (held, sufficient
identification of plaintiff).
63. Schoenfeld v. Journal Co., 204 Wis. 132, 235 N.W. 442 (1931) ("libelous"
headline did not identify plaintiff; he was named in the body of the news article, but
construed as a whole, the court said, it was clear that the plaintiff was not charged as
indicated in the headline; jury verdict for defendant was upheld).
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libelous on demurrer because they failed to identify the plaintiff, even though it was alleged he was the only "former cashier" of the bank since consolidation with another bank."
It is generally stated that defamatory matter referring to a
group is actionable by an individual member only if the group
is so small that the matter can reasonably be understood to
refer to that member or circumstances reasonably give rise to
that conclusion." There have been many decisions in other
jurisdictions and much conjecture by writers as to what size
group triggers actionability. Some Wisconsin cases have found
that a plaintiff was not identified even though the group was
very small. In Williams v. Journal Co.66 one of the alleged
libels was a statement in a news article about "a member of
the City Attorney's staff" who. had accepted retainers from a
railroad. 7 It was alleged in the complaint that, although
plaintiff was not named in that article, he was the only attorney for the city known as Special Assistant City Attorney and
that he had accepted employment from the railroad.68 Although the city attorney's staff included only four or five assistant city attorneys,"9 the court said that the plaintiff was
not sufficiently identified, that other members of the city attorney's staff might have accepted retainers too and that the
article was equally applicable to them.70
In Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co. the statement in issue was
that there were a number of persons employed at a sanitarium
"including part-time doctors, who are so-called arrested cases
of turberculosis. ' 7 1 The complaint alleged that there were

only four part-time doctors employed at the sanitarium, including plaintiff.7 2 Citing Williams, the court noted that the
64. Helmicks v. Stevlingson, 212 Wis. 614, 250 N.W. 402 (1933). The court observed that the bank was formed in 1905 and that plaintiff had been cashier for only
15 months. The dissenting justice noted that the complaint also alleged that plaintiff
was cashier when the bank closed, and felt that that and other allegations sufficiently
alleged identification. Id. at 617-18, 250 N.W.at 403 (Fowler, J., dissenting).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (1977).
66. 211 Wis. 362, 247 N.W. 435 (1933).
67. Id. at 367, 247 N.W.at 437.

68. Id. at 367-68, 247 N.W. at 438.
69. Kassowitz v. Sentinel Co., 226 Wis. 468, 472-73, 277 N.W. 177, 179 (1938)
(supplying facts not mentioned in Williams).
70. Williams, 211 Wis. at 372, 247 N.W. at 439.
71. 226 Wis. at 471, 277 N.W. at 178.

72. Id.
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allegedly libelous article did not state that all of the part-time
doctors were arrested cases of tuberculosis - that the ones
referred to may have been any one of the four and not necessarily the plaintiff. While the lack of identification was conclusive, the court3 also went on to find that the article was not
7
libelous per se.
In the Williams and Kassowitz cases, the allegedly defamatory articles indicated respectively that only "one" or "some"
members of the small groups were charged with being involved in the alleged defamatory circumstances, not all, leading to the ruling that there was insufficient identification. 4 In
De Witte v. Kearney & Trecker Corp. the allegedly identifying reference was "the small group of officers of the EIU," a
labor union.h The statement in issue indicated misconduct on
the part of that group. The court said it was elementary that
certainty as to the persons defamed "must appear from the
words themselves. '7 6 It observed that the complaint alleged
that for the entire period of time in question the four plaintiffs were the officers of EIU. It said the word "the" before
"small group" denoted the entire group or all the officers.7 7
Therefore, no innuendo was needed to identify the plaintiffs
as constituting the small group of officers to whom the writing
referred. The plaintiffs were definitely ascertainable, and they
each had a cause of action. The court distinguished the Kassowitz case, pointing out that there the reference was not to
all of the doctors, unlike the case at bar. 8 While in the De
Witt case a term which encompassed the entire small group
was held to be sufficient identification of each of the members
of a four-man group, such an all-encompassing term would
seem not to provide identification if the group is sufficiently
large, although again there could be circumstances which present exceptions. 9
The question of identification arose again in 1976 in

73. Id. at 473, 277 N.W. at 179.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (1977) comment b, for statement
of view that defamation could sometimes exist in those circumstances.
75. 265 Wis. 132, 134, 60 N.W.2d 748, 749 (1953).
76. Id. at 137, 60 N.W.2d at 751.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 138, 60 N.W.2d at 751.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A comments a & d (1977).
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Giwosky v. Journal Co.80 Without deciding whether a series of
broadcasts should be considered as one communication, the
court did so consider them for demurrer purposes. Although
he had been specifically named and identified as an absentee
landlord in the series, the court found no identification of
plaintiff in various charges stated against "some landlords"
and a "few landlords" and "absentee landlords." As to the latter, the court noted the defendant had said that "not all absentee landlords operate this way." As to the former, the court
said, plaintiff could not turn a reference to an unnamed "few"
into derogation of all.8 1

V.
A.

DEFENSES

Truth: An Absolute Defense

Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim. 2 Literal accuracy is not required. The defense of truth is available
if the statement is "substantially true.""3 It has long been the
defamation defendant's burden to plead and prove the defense of "truth," and the Wisconsin court recently reaffirmed
that law. 4 However, federal constitutional requirements have
some possible impact on this issue, as will be noted below.
B.

Common Law or Statutory Privileges

A number of "privileges" have been developed through
court decisions and legislative enactments which, in varying
degrees and under various circumstances, protect a person
from liability for defamation even though he has spoken or
written false and defamatory matter. In each instance they represent an effort to allow citizens to engage in communications which are valuable to our society with some reasonable
measure of safety from liability for defamation. Some of these
privileges are absolute; others are conditional.
80.
81.
82.
83.

71 Wis. 2d 1, 237 N.W.2d 36 (1976).
Id. at 14-15, 237 N.W.2d at 41-42.
Schaefer v. State Bar, 77 Wis. 2d 120, 125, 252 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1977).
DiMiceli v. Klieger, 58 Wis. 2d 359, 363, 206 N.W.2d 184, 187 (1973). See also

Lathan v. Journal Co., 30 Wis. 2d 146, 140 N.W.2d 417 (1966); Meier v. Meurer, 8
Wis. 2d 24, 98 N.W.2d 411 (1959); Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 141, 295

N.W.2d 768, 776 (Ct. App. 1980) (where statement was too inaccurate).
84. Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 660-61 n.35, 318 N.W.2d 141, 153 n.35
(1982).
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While federal constitutional privileges have attracted more
attention in the past two decades, these common law and statutory privileges remain vitally important under Wisconsin
law. It is not possible to list here all the privileges or all the
significant cases or to discuss them fully. A brief overview is
provided.
1.

Absolute Privileges at Common Law

There are a number of "absolute" privileges, so-called because they give complete protection even though the publisher
of the defamatory matter has acted maliciously or without
honest belief in what was said or written. These privileges
have been extended to participants in judicial and legislative
proceedings and to certain governmental executive officers of
higher echelons. 85
Thus, a judicial officer has absolute privilege if the matter
uttered has some relation to the matter before him. 86 Lawyers,
parties and witnesses are likewise protected for their statements and writings in judicial proceedings, so long as they are
pertinent and relevant to the proceeding; remote connection is
sufficient. 87 This rule (which applies to "quasi-judicial" proceedings as well) requires, however, that there be a "nexus"
between a proceeding and the statement.8 Character information given by a deputy sheriff to a police department in response to a request by a town for information regarding a iquor license applicant, has been held part of a quasi-judicial
proceeding and absolutely privileged.8 9 Statements made to a

85. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 583-592A (1977); W. PROSsupra note 2 at § 114; see also Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 452, 465-67, 141
N.W.2d 251, 257-58 (1966) for reference to executive privilege.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 585 (1977); see also Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d
825 (1955).
87. Spoehr v. Mittelstadt, 34 Wis. 2d 653, 150 N.W.2d 502 (1967) (pretrial
conference).
88. Converters Equipment Corp. v. Condes Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 257, 266-67, 258
N.W.2d 712, 716-17 (1977) (letter sent to recipients not connected with suit, and not
as an integral part of proceedings: absolute privilege denied). See also Annot., 36
A.L.R.3d 1328 (1971), regarding communications between attorneys before, after and
during proceedings.
89. Hartman v. Buerger, 71 Wis. 2d 393, 238 N.W.2d 505 (1976). On the other
hand, the meeting of the executive committee of a medical staff of a private hospital,
though involving "public interest," is not a quasi-judicial proceeding which gives rise
to an absolute privilege. DiMiceli v. Klieger, 58 Wis. 2d 359, 365-66, 206 N.W.2d 184,
SER,
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grand jury in a John Doe proceeding or to a district attorney
or his assistant in seeking issuance of a criminal complaint,
have been held to be absolutely privileged.90 A witness whose
statements in proceedings were absolutely privileged under
the law of defamation, could nevertheless be held liable under
a conspiracy charge, provided proper proof be made that there
was a conspiracy to injure the plaintiff which met statutory
tests. 91

2.

Conditional Privileges at Common Law

Many communications are "conditionally privileged." Public policy "recognizes the social utility of encouraging the free
flow of information in respect to certain occasions and persons, even at the risk of causing harm by the defamation.""2
Under common law these privileges have frequently been conditioned on the publisher's having an honest belief in the
truth of what he was saying, an acceptable basis for the belief
(ranging from good faith or lack of recklessness as to falsity,
to a requirement that there be "reasonable" grounds for such
belief), an absence of common law malice, e.g., ill will or wanton disregard of the rights of the plaintiff, and publication
only to those within the scope of the privilege. Examples of
privileged communications are: those to protect the publisher's interest; those to protect interests of another, common
interests or family relationships; and communication to a public officer in the public interest. "
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has said this type of privilege is "conditional" because the declaration must be "reasonably calculated to accomplish the privileged purpose" and
must be made without "malice. '95 In Ranous v. Hughes the
use of the word "malice" was termed "probably unfortu188 (1973).
90. Bergman v. Hupy, 64 Wis. 2d 747, 221 N.W.2d 898 (1974).

91. Radue v. Dill, 74 Wis. 2d 239, 246 N.W.2d 507 (1976) (decided on demurrer).
92. Lathan v. Journal Co., 30 Wis. 2d 146, 152, 140 N.W.2d 417, 420 (1966).
93. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 600-05 (1939). As to substantial minority position

adopting reckless disregard test instead of reasonable grounds test as to belief in
truth, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 25, Topic 3, Tit. A, special note
preceding § 593 (1977).

94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 594-98 (1977).
95. Hett v. Ploetz, 20 Wis. 2d 55, 59, 121 N.W.2d 270, 273 (1963).
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nate."96 The preferred approach was to talk instead in terms
of "abuse of the privilege which causes its loss.

'97

The court

listed with approval the four conditions enumerated by the
then existing Restatement"8 which may constitute abuse of
privilege, any one being sufficient to cause loss of the privilege. The privilege was deemed abused if defendant: (1) did
not believe in the truth of the matter published, or if he did,
had no reasonable grounds for that belief;99 (2) published for a
purpose other than that contemplated by the privilege; 100 (3)
published to a person not reasonably necessary for accomplishment of the purpose;21 1 or (4) included defamatory matter not reasonably believed necessary to accomplish the purpose of the privilege. 102 The court omitted one ground of
abuse listed in the Restatement0 " because it had no relationship to the facts of the case (the circumstances under which
rumors, even though not believed, may be published with
privilege).0 It should be noted that these tests of abuse of
privilege did not discard common law malice. In commentary
the Restatement said that if the publication is made "solely
from spite or ill will" it is an abuse and not a proper use of
the privileged occasion.

05

The current Restatement has dropped the grounds stated
in the prior sections 600 and 601 and has in a new section 600
substituted a new test of abuse of privilege: actual knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or falsity. 06 This is
the New York Times "constitutional malice" test.10 7 The Re08
statement proposed this modification because of the Gertz"
ruling that strict liability in defamation is unconstitutional,
96. 30 Wis. 2d 452, 467, 141 N.W.2d 251, 258 (1966).
97. Id. at 468, 141 N.W.2d at 258.
98. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 600,-01,-03,-05 (1939).
99. Id. at § 600-01.
100. Id. at § 603.
101. Id. at § 604.
102. Id. at § 605.
103. Id. at § 602.
104. 30 Wis. 2d at 470, 141 N.W.2d at 260.
105. RESTATEENT OF TORTS § 603 (1939).
106. RESTATEENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977). Old § 601 is omitted, being
covered by § 600; old §§ 602-05 remain in substantially the same form as in the prior
(1939) edition.
107. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See infra Section V.
108. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See infra Section V.
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and that at a minimum there must be fault on the part of the
publisher amounting to at least negligence (at least in those
cases subject to the Gertz rule). Thus, under Gertz restrictions, plaintiffs must in all cases, even unprivileged situations,
prove elements which would constitute abuse of privilege (and
thus defeat privilege) under the old rules. The result would be
that privileged situations would lose their significance. The
higher standard proposed in the new rule would distinguish
privileged situations from nonprivileged situations, as did the
prior law, and give them better protection. In applying the
New York Times "actual malice" test, the Restatement noted
that it had been earlier applied by a "substantial minority" of
jurisdictions as a common law abuse of privilege test.109 Recognizing that Gertz might not be applied to all cases, or to the
fullest extent suggested by the ruling, the Restatement did
not rewrite all of its conditional privilege rules.110
Wisconsin has not applied the Gertz fault rules to all
cases, so the Restatement's new abuse of privilege rule, if applied at all by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, would undoubtedly be limited to only those cases covered by Gertz, where
fault is a required element. In Calero v. Del Chemical
Corp.,""' decided after Gertz, the court ruled that the case was
not subject to a federal constitutional privilege and the "actual malice" standard, but was subject to a common law conditional privilege test.1 1 2 Reverting to the term called "unfortunate" in Ranous, it said the proper test to apply to
determine whether the nonconstitutional conditional privilege
was abused is a question of "express [common law] malice"
(ill will, revenge, etc.), distinguishing that kind of malice from
constitutional "actual malice." ' The court commented that
in some cases a good faith belief in the truth of the statement
is sufficient to establish the privilege, quoting with approval
from an older case in which it was said that statements are
protected if they are made in good faith belief of truth, are
109. See discussion, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 25, Topic 3, Tit. A,
special note preceding § 593, § 593 and other sections there referenced (1977).
110. See Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 660-61, 318 N.W.2d 141, 152 (1982);
see also Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
111. 68 Wis. 2d at 507, 228 N.W.2d at 748.
112. Id. at 498, 228 N.W.2d at 744.
113. Id. at 507, 228 N.W.2d at 748.
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based on some tangible information and are made from an
honest desire to promote public justice, to the proper officer,
or to one believed to be the proper officer, even though some
more prudent person would not perhaps have believed in the
truth of the information. 114 Thus the court pointed out that
in some cases of conditional privilege, a recklessness test as to
truth has been considered sufficient in testing the defendant's
responsibility for the truth of his statement; this test is more
favorable to the defendant than the Restatement's section 601
negligence test (whether a reasonably prudent person would
have believed the facts he communicated). 115 More recently,
respecting a defendant held not subject to Gertz, the court
reiterated the old Restatement tests for abuse of conditional
privilege which had been set forth in Ranous.1 "
There are numerous Wisconsin cases regarding conditional
privileges. Some examples of the circumstances in which the
issue has arisen are credit reports,

persons with common
officers. 119

interest 1

17

communications between

" and communications to law

3. Fair Comment
As noted above, "fair comment" has been treated both as
nondefamatory and as privileged defamation. The first Restatement120 treated the common law protection of fair com-

ment as a privilege, setting forth a rule
out defamation liability, (1) criticize
which were of public concern provided
based on a true or privileged statement

that one could, withactivities of another
(a) the criticism was
of fact or facts other-

114. Id. at 498-99, 228 N.W.2d at 744.
115. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 601 (1939).
116. Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 663-64, 318 N.W.2d 141, 154 (1982) (quoting Ranous, 30 Wis. 2d at 468, 141 N.W.2d at 259 (1966)).
117. See, e.g., Barker v. Retail Credit Co., 8 Wis. 2d 664, 100 N.W.2d 391 (1960).
118. See, e.g., Hett v. Ploetz, 20 Wis. 2d 55, 121 N.W.2d 270 (1963) (statements
regarding qualifications of a teacher).
119. See, e.g., Lisowski v. Chenenoff, 37 Wis. 2d 610, 155 N.W.2d 619 (1968) (privilege not allowed); Otten v. Schutt, 15 Wis. 2d 497, 113 N.W.2d 152 (1962) (privilege
denied because jury could properly infer from evidence that communication was not
made for proper purpose of apprehending or punishing one who had committed a
crime).
120. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977) has dropped the "fair comment" section which was in its original publication, considering that federal constitutional protections suggested by Gertz have superseded it.
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wise known or available to the recipient as a member of the
public and (b) represented the actual opinion of the critic and
(c) was not solely for the purpose of harming the other; and
(2) criticize private conduct or character of another who is engaged in activities of public concern insofar as the private
conduct or character affected his public conduct, provided it
complied with (a), (b) and (c) above, and in addition was a
criticism which a man of reasonable intelligence and judgment
might make. Criticism of the public acts of a public man, category (1), did not have to be "reasonable," as was required for
a personal attack, category (2).121 This doctrine was applied to
public officers and candidates for office, to management of various institutions, and to literary, artistic and scientific
pro122
ductions and public sports events among other things.
The defense of fair comment has been recognized by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in a number of cases, but in some
the court denied the privilege where the criticism was too personal, as opposed to criticism of the person's performance, or
was irrelevant to the public matter or appeared malicious. 2 '
The supreme court said in Arnold v. Ingram that the qualified
privilege to discuss the relevant demerits of a candidate for
office is broader than the defense of fair comment and criticism of a book or play.12
121. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1939); see also id. §§ 607-10.

122. Id. at § 606 comment a.
123. See, e.g., Buckstaff v. Viall, 84 Wis. 129, 54 N.W. 111 (1893) (the defense was
not allowed because, rather than being a fair and reasonable comment on the plaintiff's conduct as a senator, the remarks in issue were personal gibes, taunts and insults not properly related to his official conduct); Pfister v. Milwaukee Free Press Co.,
139 Wis. 627, 640, 121 N.W. 938, 944 (1909) (defense not allowed because plaintiff not
an official, or candidate, nor had he sought and invited "public patronage"); Arnold v.
Ingrain, 151 Wis. 438, 138 N.W. 111 (1913) (privilege allowed); Stevens v. Morse, 185
Wis. 500, 201 N.W. 815 (1925) (defense denied; article evinced hatred and contempt;
it appeared that object was to humiliate); Lukaszewicz v. Dziadulewicz, 198 Wis. 605,
225 N.W. 172 (1929) (the court found the basic facts not to be in dispute, and said
that if plaintiff was held up to public ridicule by reason of the comments, it was due
not to conclusions in the comments but the undisputed facts. It noted that the basis
of the comments might not be a substantial basis for comparing candidates (their war
records), but observed it was an old practice, and that: "[I]n a democracy appeals
may be made to prejudice as well as common sense." Id. at 608, 225 N.W. at 173);
Grell v. Hoard, 206 Wis. 187, 239 N.W. 428 (1931) (privilege allowed). In Hoan v.
Journal Co., 238 Wis. 311, 328, 298 N.W. 228, 236 (1941), the court quoted the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1939) with approval.
124. 151 Wis. at 456, 138 N.W. at 118.
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Comment may be caustic and severe when confined to the
facts, 2 5 and yet may not be too hateful or contemptuous. 26 In
Grell v. Hoard 27 the court said the case was a close one and
that in doubtful cases (of comment and criticisms of a public
official) "the doubt should be resolved in favor of free criticism and discussion."' 28 The court emphasized the right of
citizens to express opinions about public officials so long as
they were fairly and reasonably based on fact, and it distinguished the actionable charging of an official with disregard
for human life from the nonactionable condemning of his
work for lack of safety:
Charging a public officer with being inefficient and incapable
in the performance of the duties of his office when the
charge has some fair and reasonable basis in fact is not
libelous. What constitutes efficiency and capability must always be matters of opinion. There are no absolute standards
by which the conduct of public officials may be judged. So
far as the charge relates to a lack of regard for human life
and personal safety, it is not a charge against Mr. Grell personally but a condemnation of the type of ditch which he, as
highway engineer, is having constructed in Jefferson
129
county.

4. Statutory Privilege to Report Legislative, Judicial or
Other Public Official Proceedings
Section 895.05(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides:
Damages In Actions For Libel. (1) The proprietor, pub-

lisher, editor, writer or reporter upon any newspaper published in this state shall not be liable in any civil action for
libel for the publication in such newspaper of a true and fair
report of any judicial, legislative or other public official proceeding authorized by law or of any public statement,
speech, argument or debate in the course of such proceeding.
This section shall not be construed to exempt any such proprietor, publisher, editor, writer or reporter from liability for
any libelous matter contained inany headline or headings to
125. Lukaszewicz v. Dziadulewicz, 198 Wis. 605, 608, 225 N.W. 172, 173-74 (1929).
126.
127.
128.
129.

Stevens v. Morse, 185 Wis. 500, 503, 201 N.W. 815, 816 (1925).
206 Wis. 187, 239 N.W. 428 (1931).
Id. at 193, 239 N.W. at 430.
Id. at 191, 239 N.W. at 430.
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any such report, or to libelous remarks or comments added
or interpolated in any such report or made and published
concerning the same, which remarks or comments were not
uttered by the person libeled or spoken concerning him in
the course of such proceeding by some other person.130
This statute, which includes long standing common law privileges accorded the reporting of legislative and judicial proceedings, and extends a like privilege to the reporting of all
"other public official proceedings," provides an unconditional
privilege.1 31 Citations to cases concerning this law are readily
available in annotations to the statute;' cases in other jurisdictions are of value in construing areas not yet covered by
Wisconsin decisions, particularly the scope of activities which
fall within the meaning of "proceedings. "' 3
5.

Statutory Prerequisites and Other Terms
Section 895.05(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides:
Before any civil action shall be commenced on account of
any libelous publication in any newspaper, magazine or periodical, the libeled person shall first give those alleged to be
responsible or liable for the publication a reasonable opportunity to correct the libelous matter. Such opportunity shall
be given by notice in writing specifying the article and the
statements therein which are claimed to be false and defamatory and a statement of what are claimed to be true facts
may be ascertained with definiteness and certainty. The first
issue published after the expiration of one week from the
receipt of such notice shall be within a reasonable time for
correction. To the extent that the true facts are, with reasonable diligence, ascertainable with definiteness and certainty, only a retraction shall constitute a correction; other-

130. Wis. STAT. § 895.05(1) (1979).
131. See Williams v. Journal Co., 211 Wis. 362, 368, 247 N.W. 435, 438 (1933);
Lehner v. Berlin Publishing Co., 209 Wis. 536, 539, 245 N.W. 685, 686 (1932).
132. See, e.g., Williams v. Journal Co., 211 Wis. 362, 247 N.W. 435 (1933) (privilege to publish news account of grand jury report even though report improperly filed
in court and subsequently stricken from court files); Finnegan v. Eagle Printing Co.,
173 Wis. 5, 179 N.W.788 (1920) (publication of pleadings or other preliminary papers
to which the attention of no judicial officer has been called and no judicial attention
invited is not privileged).
133. See, e.g., Porter v. Guam Publications, 643 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1981) (news
report of a police bulletin compiling complaints and arrests held privileged as report
of an official proceeding).

1982]

DEFAMATION

wise the publication of the libeled person's statement of the
true facts, or so much thereof as shall not be libelous of another, scurrilous, or otherwise improper for publication,
published as his statement, shall constitute a correction
within the meaning of this section. A correction, timely published, without comment, in a position and type as prominent as the alleged libel, shall constitute a defense against
the recovery of any damages except actual damages, as well
as being competent and material in mitigation of actual
damages to the extent the correction published does so mitigate them.134
The notice requirement of this statute applies not only to media defendants, but also to nomnedia defendants whose allegedly libelous statements are published in the press. It has
been held not to apply to statements broadcast on radio or
television. 3 5 Notice addressed to a company was not notice
to individual defendants even though they were officers of the
company and some of the them were named in the notice as
persons who made the allegedly libelous statements (later
published in the press).'
Section 895.052 of the Wisconsin Statutes exempts radio
and television from liability for defamation contained in some
political broadcasts.13 7
C. Federal ConstitutionalPrivileges'8 8
1. New York Times to Gertz
The right to make "fair comment" on public officials and
candidates has long been recognized. Comment could be

harsh, and in doubtful cases, doubt was to be "resolved in
134. Wis. STAT. § 895.05(2) (1979).
135. See Hucko v. Jos. Schiltz Brewing Co., 100 Wis. 2d 372, 374, 302 N.W.2d 68,
70 (Ct. App. 1981).
136. Id. at 375-76, 385-86, 302 N.W.2d at 71, 75.
137. Wis. STAT. § 895.052 (1979).
138. The Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated in the latest Denny case that the
Wisconsin Constitution provides no greater press protection in defamation law than
the federal constitution. Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 655-56 n.27, 318 N.W.2d
141, 150 n.27 (1982). This seems inconsistent with statements by the court in Zelenka
v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 601, 617, 266 N.W.2d 279, 286 (1978) and Giwosky v. Journal Co.,
71 Wis.2d 1, 16, 237 N.W.2d 36, 43 (1976). Justice Abrahamson, in her dissent in
Denny, 106 Wis. 2d at 672-73, 318 N.W.2d at 158-59, states that Wisconsin's constitutional protections of speech are broader than the first amendment. This important
subject is too broad to treat in this limited article.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:505

favor of free criticism and discussion." 13 9 Officials could not be
"too thin-skinned" about critical comment. 140 But the right to
"comment" or give opinions did not protect factual misstatements in the majority of American jurisdictions, including
Wisconsin. However, starting in 1964, a series of United
States Supreme Court decisions significantly altered the law
of defamation.
In New York Times v. Sullivan14 1 it was held that as a
matter of first amendment right, even factual misstatements
about a public official were immune to libel liability in the
absence of "actual malice" - defined as (1) actual knowledge
that the statements were false or (2) reckless disregard as to
whether or not they were false.1 42 The states must, of course,
honor this constitutional requirement.
This "constitutional" malice is not proved by showing that
defendant did not have a "reasonable belief" in the truth of
what he said. The defendant prevails if he had only an "honest belief." Constitutional malice is not proved by showing
common law malice (ill will, hatred, etc.).14 ' For "reckless disregard" to exist, the defendant must have entertained "serious doubts" as to the truth of the publication. 144 The plaintiff
1 45
must show a "high degree of awareness of probable falsity.
The burden of proving malice is on the plaintiff. It is not a
mere preponderance of the evidence test. Malice must be
1' 46
proven with "convincing clarity.
In New York Times, the Court said: "Thus we consider
this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehemeiit, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. 1 47 The Court
said that in such public debate erroneous statements are inev-

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Grel, 206 Wis. at 193, 239 N.W. at 430.'
Arnold, 151 Wis. at 457, 138 N.W. at 119.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 280.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1964).
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
Id. at 270.
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itable and must be excused if freedom of expression is to have
the "breathing space" it needs to survive.1 4

Thereafter the United States Supreme Court extended the
New York Times protection. In Curtis Publishing Co. v.
ButtS1 49 it held that the Times rule was applicable in suits by
"public figures" as well as by public officials.
The next step under the New York Times rationale was
the extension of the rule to protect publications concerning
matters of public interest and concern, even if the plaintiff
was not himself a "public official" or "public figure." A number of lower courts did so, and the United States Supreme
Court did so in a fractionated decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia.150 A plurality of the Court held that the New York
Times protection applied whenever the subject of the report
was a matter which "is a subject of public or general interest,"
even though the offended plaintiff was neither an official nor a
public figure. 151 The Court had sharply divided views. The
basis of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion was this: "We
honor the commitment to robust debate on public issues,
which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending
constitutional protection to all discussion and communication
involving matters of public or general concern, without regard
1 52
to whether the persons involved are famous or anonymous.

Decisions before and after Rosenbloom which allowed a constitutional privilege in reporting matters of sufficient public
interest and concern found that such interest and concern existed in reports about a garbage company with municipal contracts,153 whether improper preparation of food had caused
widespread illness,"M the hazard of injury posed by a toy, 55
the sale of intoxicants to minors"' and whether a heating unit
148. Id. at 271-72.
149. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
150. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
151. Id. at 43-44.
152. Id.
153. Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 412, 414 (S.D.N. '.
1969).
154. Pace v. McGrath, 378 F. Supp. 140, 144 (D. Md. 1974).
155. F & J Enters. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 373 F. Supp. 292, 297 (N.D.
Ohio 1974).
156. West v. Northern Publishing Co., 487 P.2d 1304 (Alaska 1971).
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caused a fire, 157 among others.
The issue was re-examined by the United States Supreme
Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.15s The Court ruled that
the extension of the New York Times rule in Rosenbloom was
not required by the federal constitution, and restricted Times
protection to suits by public officials or public figures. However, it did require that, in suits by "private" plaintiffs, there
be at least a finding of "fault" on the part of the defendant
rather than the strict liability which existed at common law.
It did not rule that that federal constitutional minimum protection must be the maximum protection afforded to defamation defendants by states. Rather, the Court concluded, the
degree of protection afforded speech on matters involving
"private" plaintiffs (so long as it was not less than what Gertz
required), was within the province of-each of the states: "We
hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defama59
tory falsehood injurious to a private individual.'
The Gertz ruling applies at least where the content of the
defamatory statement "makes substantial danger to reputation apparent."1 6 The Court said: "Our inquiry would involve
considerations somewhat different. . . if a State purported to
condition civil liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a resonably prudent editor or broadcaster of
its defamatory potential."1 6 1
The Court also ruled that states may not permit recovery
of presumed or punitive damages unless the plaintiff proves
the defendant had actual knowledge of falsity or had reckless
disregard for the truth. Actual damages would have to be
proved in such a case, but they could include, in addition to
special damages, damages to reputation, loss of standing in
the community, mental suffering and anguish. 6 2

157. Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162
Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner the
Detroit Free Press Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978).
158. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
159. Id. at 347.
160. Id. at 348 (quoting from Curtis Publishing Co., 388 U.S. at 155).
161. Id. at 348.
162. Id. at 349-50.
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2. Post-Gertz Decisions Outside Wisconsin
After Gertz, state courts presented with defamation suits
brought by plaintiffs who were neither public figures nor public officials had to decide whether they would apply the minimum test of negligence federally mandated by Gertz or some
higher test, and in some instances, whether Gertz applied at
all to the case at hand. A number of states, faced with that
choice, elected to adopt the Gertz minimum negligence standard - generally, a requirement that the defendant knew or
should have known, in the exercise of reasonable care, that
the publication was false.163 Several states chose to apply a
stricter test than negligence, provided the publication related
to a matter of public intereft and concern, as was the case in
Gertz. Some of them, following Rosenbloom concepts, used
some varithe New York Times "malice" test;" others chose
16 5
ation of the malice test, stricter than negligence.

Does the concept of fault apply to the issue of defamatory
meaning, too? Should not a nonnegligent unawareness on the
part of the publisher that the publication is defamatory protect the defendant as well as nonnegligent unawareness of falsity? Gertz expressly restricted its (minimum) negligence rule
to cases where the substance of the defamatory statement
makes "substantial danger to reputation apparent."" 6 Obviously, it intended no lesser protection than a negligence standard for a defendant who reasonably was unaware of the danger of defamation (e.g., did not know of some extrinsic facts
which supplied defamatory meaning). If that danger is not apparent, would the New York Times "actual malice" test still
apply, at least in matters of public interest and concern? The
Supreme Court has certainly indicated that the media, at
least, should have greater protection than a negligence standard with respect to awareness of defamation. It said, in
Time, Inc. v. Hill:
163. See, e.g., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216
(1977); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.
2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
164. See, e.g., Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications,
Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976);
Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978).
165. See, e.g., Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341
N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
166. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
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We create a grave risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a free society if we saddle
the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty the facts associated in news articles with a person's
name, picture or portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter. Even negligence would be a most elusive
standard, especially when the content of the speech itself affords no warning of prospective harm to another through
falsity. A negligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy of
1 7
every reference to a name, picture or portrait. 1

Gertz involved a media defendant, and the Court spoke
frequently of the media and stated its "fault" rule in terms of
a "publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood. ' ' 168 State
courts have disagreed as to whether the Gertz fault rule
should apply to private defendants as well as media defendants.1 6 9 The Restatement takes the position that it should,
i.e., that the private defendant should have as much protec170
tion as the media.
3.

Wisconsin Decisions after Rosenbloom

In two cases after Rosenbloom and prior to Gertz, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited the "public interest and concern
test" of Rosenbloom in giving New York Times protection to
1 71 after citing the
the defendant. In Polzin v. Helmbrecht,
test, the court said that a letter written to the media by the
defendant about the plaintiff reporter discussed "a matter of

167. 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
168. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48. Was the Court thereby referring to any writer or
speaker of defamation, or was it using the words in their media sense?
169. See, e.g., Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976),
where the court suggested that the United States Supreme Court should apply Gertz
for both media and nonmedia defendants but in any event adopted that rule as state
law. Id. at -,
350 A.2d at 694-95. Contra Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v.
Markley, 279 Or. 361, .,
568 P.2d 1359, 1363-64 (1977), where it was held Gertz
did not apply for benefit for a nonmedia defendant in the case before the court where
there was "no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues. . . . "The court
concluded that "Gertz does not require application of the constitutional privilege to
defamation actions between private parties insofar as the issues raised here are concerned." Id. at -, 568 P.2d at 1365 (emphasis added).
170. RESTATrEMENT (SE COND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1977).
171. 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972).
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public concern - the financing of pollution control measures
at Mayville, 17 ' and that the nonmedia defendant, a critic of
the press, was entitled to the same protection as the media
would have were it the defendant. In Richards v. Gruen173 the
court reaffirmed its adherence to Polzin, referring both to the
fact that plaintiff had voluntarily involved himself in the matter and that the matter was one of public or general interest.
Following Gertz, after the Rosenbloom standard was no
longer required, the Wisconsin Supreme Court continued to
refer to the public interest concept. The first such case was
Calero v. Del Chemical Corp.,17 4 a suit involving a "private"
plaintiff who was neither a public official nor a public figure,
and a nonmedia defendant, concerning interemployer communications. The court ruled that the case required application
of a common law conditional privilege, not the New York
Times "malice" test,17 5 and that the Gertz requirements regarding punitive damages did not apply because the case involved a "private" defamation not involving first amendment
principles. It cited three factors: "In the case before us there
is no matter of general or public interest; there is no public
official or public figure; there is no involvement of the media,
either broadcast or print. '17 The court noted that Gertz expressly referred to "publishers and broadcasters. ' 77 It said in
distinguishing and referring to Polzin that: "This focus on the
media and the 'matter of public concern' which the court
makes in this passage is the key to the distinction between
constitutional and nonconstitutional conditional privileges in
'1 78
defamation law.
More recently, in Giwosky v. Journal Co., 179 citing to the
Gertz pronouncement that states were free to define appropriate standards of liability for defamation of private individuals,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court said:

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
62
68
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
71

at 586, 196 N.W.2d at 690.
Wis. 2d 99, 109-10, 214 N.W.2d 309, 314 (1974).
Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
at 500, 228 N.W.2d at 745.
at 506, 228 N.W.2d at 748.
at 504-05, 228 N.W.2d at 747.
at 501, 228 N.W.2d at 745.
Wis. 2d 1, 237 N.W.2d 36 (1976).
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Art. I, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, providing that
the legislature shall make no law "to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press," clearly seeks to protect the
right of such news coverage and such editorial comment as
to conditions in a community or issues of public concern.180
In Schaefer v. State Bar, reversing a judgment of dismissal on demurrer, the court said that'at trial the State Bar, a
nonmedia defendant, would be entitled to protection under an
actual malice or reckless or careless disregard test because
Mrs. Schaefer had "made this a public issue or matter of public concern."1 s1
Of these cases (Giwosky did not decide constitutional issues), only Calero was found not to be within constitutional
protections. Clearly, Calero was not a public figure or public
official, and the private matter involved was not of public interest or concern. The court distinguished Calero from cases
involving constitutional protection by noting it had none of
the criteria of New York Times, Gertz or Rosenbloom; it did
not specify which criterion, or which combination of those criteria, would invoke the application of Gertz. Since the court
ruled that the case was outside the scope of Gertz, it did not
decide what fault standards it would adopt were Gertz applicable. The court did, however, by repeated reference after
Gertz to the Rosenbloom concept of public interest and concern, suggest that defamation involving matters of public concern would receive more protection than private defamation.
The most recent opinion in Denny v. Mertz 82 has answered, for Wisconsin, at least some of the questions raised by
Gertz, but it also raises some others. Because the case is significant, it warrants detailed discussion. Denny sued Mertz for
defamation for a statement he made to Business Week, and
also sued McGraw-Hill, the publisher of Business Week for its
republication. Defendants argued that Denny was a public
figure, and alternatively that even if he were not, the matter
involved was one of public interest and concern, and that the
New York Times malice test should apply. The court of ap-

180. Id. at 16, 237 N.W.2d at 43.

181. 77 Wis. 2d 120, 125, 252 N.W.2d 343, 346 (1977).
182. 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982).
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peals ruled1 8 and the supreme court affirmed 184 that Denny
was not a public figure. Clearly he was not a public official. On
that basis, the Times test was not mandated by the federal
constitution.
The next question the court considered was what protections were to be afforded McGraw-Hill, in view of Gertz. The
court elected not to require greater protection for the defendant than the minimum required by Gertz, i.e., a negligence
standard; it also ruled, per Gertz, that presumed or punitive
damages could be awarded against McGraw-Hill only on proof
that it had acted with "actual malice" (the New York Times
test).185 Finally, it ruled that Gertz did not provide any constitutional protection to a nonmedia defendant, and that
Mertz would be held to liability under the common law of the
strict liability unless a conditional privilege
state applied.1 8 8
In deciding Denny was not a public figure, the court considered, using tests from Gertz, whether Denny had thrust
himself into a "public controversy" so as to influence its outcome and whether his status gave him access to the media.
The court said that the nature and impact of the controversy,
and the interest in it, has a bearing on whether it is a "public
controversy. ' 1 87 It said that the general subject matter involved, stockholder disputes at Koehring Company, was newsworthy but "did not have an impact outside of those immediately interested in the Koehring corporation."1 88 It found also,
that while Denny deliberately involved himself in the stockholder dispute, he did not have such media access as would
justify designating him a public figure, and that by the time
the reporter involved talked to him, the controversy had ended. Further, it said, contacts with the reporter concerning
the article may not themselves transform him into a public
figure - that he could not be made into a public figure by the

183. Denny v. Mertz, 100 Wis. 2d 332, 302 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1981).
184. Denny, 106 Wis. 2d at 650, 318 N.W.2d at 148. The court referred to this as
the "principal issue." Id. at 639, 318 N.W.2d at 142.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 661-64, 318 N.W.2d at 153-54.
187. Id. at 649-50, 318 N.W.2d at 147.
188. Id. at 650, 318 N.W.2d at 148.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:505

very publication which defames him. 189

Justice Abrahamson, dissenting, concluded that Denny
was a public figure - that he had thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy to influence the resolution of the
dispute. She stated that the majority had erred in relying too
heavily on an analysis of the substantive nature of the controversy and then concluded that it was not of public interest or
concern: "Instead of analyzing the substantive nature of the
controversy, the majority should have asked whether the
Koehring controversy was an existing publicly debated dispute into which Denny had involuntarily thrust himself before
the alleged defamation occurred. It was."1 90 She stated that
even if the controversy had ended a few weeks before the
story, Denny would not cease to be a public figure with respect to the controversy in the short span of a few weeks. She
added that the majority had misread Gertz in indicating that
a person had to have media access to be a public figure, pointing out that the Gertz Court had merely said that public
figures "usually" enjoy greater access which provides justification for less protection.1 91
Having decided Denny was a private individual, the court
next considered what standard of liability it should set for an
action brought by private individuals against the news media,
recognizing that Gertz mandated that there could be no liability without fault. The court noted that the majority of jurisdictions which had set standards pursuant to Gertz had
adopted a negligence standard, and that a few states had
adopted a higher standard, some an actual malice standard if
the defamation involved a matter of public concern. The court
189. Id. at 649-51, 318 N.W.2d at 147-48. In Schaefer, 77 Wis. 2d at 125, 252
N.W.2d at 346, the issue before the court was whether, at the demurrer stage, certain
words were defamatory. The court, however, commented that at the trial, plaintiff
would have to prove actual malice or a reckless or careless disregard for the truth
because "Mrs. Schaefer has made this a public issue or matter of public concern
....
"Id. This language, and the supporting citations, suggested both that Mrs.
Schaefer had "public figure" status, and that the publication involved "public concern" issues, although the court did not expressly describe her as a "public figure."
The public issue in which she had been involved, the opinion indicated, was the probate of her husband's estate, in which problems had arisen, leading to newspaper

articles.
190. Denny, 106 Wis. 2d at 668, 318 N.W.2d at 156 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 669, 318 N.W.2d at 157.

1982]

DEFAMATION

considered persuasive the argument for a negligence standard
set forth in a 1975 Illinois case19 and agreed with its reasoning. It felt a negligence standard in a suit by a private individual alleging defamation by the media was sufficient protection
for the freedom of the press guaranteed by the Wisconsin
Constitution and that the public policy balance favored such a
standard. 193
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Abrahamson said a due
care standard might arguably represent a fair balance and
that she "could be persuaded" to accept it in cases involving a
truly "private person" if the majority had not so narrowly
construed "public figure."''
The court then proceeded to consider the application of
Gertz to the individual defendant Mertz. It said the United
States Supreme Court had never ruled whether the minimum
standards governing defamation actions by "private persons"
set forth in Gertz applied to all defendants, or just media defendants. 19 5 It reaffirmed its holding in Calero'" that the

Gertz restrictions would not apply to a "purely private" communication between individuals, and refused to extend Gertz
to the nonmedia defendant, Mertz.1 97 The Wisconsin court

recognized that some courts in other jurisdictions had held
that the Gertz protections applied to protect all defendants,
nonmedia as well as media, and that this was the Restatement
position, but it did not read Gertz as requiring that, nor did it
192. Troman v. Wood, 62 Il1. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292, 296-99 (1975). It should be
noted that the Illinois court, in adopting a negligence standard, qualified the test by
restricting it to a "defamatory publication whose substantial danger to reputation is
apparent." Id. at -, 340 N.E.2d at 299. In so doing, the Illinois court was reflecting
what the United States Supreme Court had said in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348. The court
was undoubtedly referring to situations where a statement not defamatory on its face
is made so because of extrinsic facts not known to the defendant. The court appears
to suggest that such a circumstance might demand a higher test See also Maynard v.
Port Publications, Inc., 98 Wis. 2d 555, 566, 297 N.W.2d 500, 506 (1980) ("For fault to
exist the defendant must know or have reason to know of the libel.").
193. Denny, 106 Wis. 2d at 654-56, 318 N.W.2d at 150-51.
194. Id. at 670, 318 N.W.2d at 157 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 660, 318 N.W.2d at 152.
196. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
197. 106 Wis. 2d at 660-61, 318 N.W.2d at 152-53. The court noted that in Polzin
v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d at 586, 196 N.W.2d at 690, it had held that critics of the
media were entitled to the same level of protection against actions for defamation as
was the media, but said that was not an issue in the Denny case. 106 Wis. 2d at 660,
318 N.W.2d at 152.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:505

consider it good policy to so hold."' s
Justice Abrahamson said in her dissent that it is unclear
from the language and reasoning of the majority opinion
whether the common law of defamation is being adopted for
all nonmedia defendants, irrespective of the nature of the
plaintiff (public official, public figure or private person), or is
restricted to cases of a private person suing a nonmedia defendant, the situation held to exist in Denny.199 Stated another way, will the court refuse to give the protection of the
New York Times "actual malice" test to a nonmedia defendant in a suit by a public official or public figure? Certainly
authority demonstrates that the nonmedia defendant is entitled to that protection.
While the United States Supreme Court has said it has
never decided whether the New York Times "actual malice"
test applies in suits by public officials or figures against
nonmedia defendants, 00 many courts, including the United
States Supreme Court, 201 have applied it. I am unaware of any

198. Denny, 106 Wis. 2d at 660-61, 318 N.W.2d at 152-53. Justice Abrahamson
disagreed with the decision of the majority that the Gertz restrictions should not
apply in a suit against a nonmedia defendant. Among other things, she contended
that the differing treatment violates the equal protection and freedom of speech guarantees of the state constitution, that it raises the difficult question of identifying
which defendants are media defendants and which are not, and that the decision
would add complexity to a field already renowned for its complexity. She noted that
in Denny, while the majority refused to apply the negligence standard for Mertz, it
did appear that he might be entitled to a conditional privilege which would result in a
comparable standard. Id. at 674-75, 318 N.W.2d at 159 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
Justice Heffernan, in his concurring opinion, joined Justice Abrahamson's dissent
with respect to the application of standards to media and nonmedia defendants. Id.
at 665, 318 N.W.2d at 155 (Heffernan, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 671-72, 318 N.W.2d at 157-58.
200. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979).
201. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). In Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis.
2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494 (1971), the Wisconsin court citing St. Amant said, "The
Times-Sullivan rule is not confined to news media and free press but also applies to
private individuals and free speech in some cases." Id. at 183, 188 N.W.2d at 499. St.
Amant was a suit by a deputy sheriff against a nonmedia defendant who had been a
candidate for the senate. In Calero, 68 Wis. 2d at 505, 228 N.W.2d at 747, the court
distinguished St. Amant from Calero on the ground that the allegedly defamatory
statements by the candidate for public office (St. Amant) about the deputy sheriff
were in the constitutional arena, quoting the United States Supreme Court's emphasis on the stake of the people in public business and the conduct of public officials.
(The Wisconsin court also noted that the statements were made in a televised
speech.) The United States Supreme Court made the quoted policy statement in reference to the definition of "reckless disregard." Its application of the actual malice
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case refusing so to apply it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has itself applied the New York Times "actual malice" test in
several cases against nonmedia defendants where the plaintiff
was a public figure or public official or the matter was one of
the public interest or concern, although those precise terms
have not always been used.20 2
It was argued by defendants in Denny that the court
should apply the actual malice test under a Rosenbloom concept, even if the plaintiff was not deemed a public figure, because a matter of public interest and concern was involved. By
citing both (1) cases which apply an actual malice test to private plaintiff suits in matters of public interest and concern,
and (2) those which apply a negligence test in private plaintiff
suits, and then choosing the latter in'suits against the media,
the court may have intended to state an absolute position on
all private plaintiff suits, whatever the subject matter of the
defamation. However, as in Calero, the publication in Denny
did not involve public issues. The court, in deciding the "public figure" question, had found the issues to be not of general
public concern. (The court of appeals, too, had said it "was
not a matter of public controversy or concern. ' 20 3) The court
did not disavow any of its language in prior cases in which it
related the New York Times "actual malice" protection to
communications involving public interest and concern.
May the Wisconsin Supreme Court still adopt a higher
standard than negligence in a suit by a "private" plaintiff, at
least for a media defen'dant, in a case where the publication
truly relates to vital matters of general public concern? If, as
decided in Denny, a negligence standard is constitutionally
mandated for the media defendant in a matter not of public
concern, would it not be appropriate to apply a more protective standard where the press undertakes to write about highly important public issues, even though the plaintiff who is
involved in the matters turns out not to meet the strict tests

test, however, was predicated on the definitional determination that the plaintiff
Thompson, a deputy sheriff, was a public official. 390 U.S. at 730.
202. See Schaefer, 77 Wis. 2d 120, 252 N.W.2d 343 (1977); Richards, 62 Wis. 2d
99, 214 N.W.2d 309 (1974); Polzin, 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685 (1972); Dalton v.
Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 182-83, 188 N.W.2d 494, 499 (1971) (where Dalton, an assistant attorney general, was referred to as a "public figure").
203. Denny v. Mertz, 100 Wis. 2d 332, 341, 302 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Ct. App. 1981).
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of a "public figure"? Certainly circumstances can be posed
which would seem to justify such a policy consideration, and,
as has been noted, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly made the distinction, for constitutional purposes, between private and public subject matter. 04
As Justice Abrahamson has pointed out, a less restricted
definition of "public figure" might serve, too, to better balance
the respective rights. The literal Gertz definitions of "public
figure," geared to the facts of that case, do not necessarily fit
all cases or the common or logical concepts of a "public
figure." One example is the requirement that the public figure
be involved in a "public controversy." It would seem there
might be equally good constitutional and policy reasons for
protecting speech about voluntary participants in a vitally important public matter, even though there is yet no "debate. '205 That the Gertz definitions should have some flexibility is demonstrated not only by logic but by the comment
of the Gertz Court itself. After discussing some general characteristics of public figures, it described its statements as
"generalities" and noted they might not "obtain in every
instance.

' 206

The comment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a per-

son may not be made into a public figure by the very publication which defames him 20 7 understandably is aimed at
preventing a defendant from "bootstrapping" a public figure
defense by publicizing something which is inherently a private
204. These questions and others were posed in an amicus brief in Denny. The
court did not specifically address the ultimate question of a matter of true public
concern in its opinion. It may have rejected positions concerning such issues without
comment, or it may have considered it unnecessary to reach them.
205. Assume, for example, that an explosion is admittedly imminent at a nuclear
power plant, and a private industry expert arrives, holds press conferences, and proceeds to work on the dangerous problem. Should not the press have as much protection in writing about that situation, including the expert in whose hands public safety
lies, (even though there is not a present "controversy" in the sense of debate), as it
does in writing about an unimportant activity of a public official, or about the "public
figure" in a public controversy involving relatively unimportant issues? Prior decisions of the Wisconsin court would seem to indicate that such a matter would be
within the scope of constitutional protection. In any event in such a situation, should
the press not have more protection than when, as in Denny, it writes about a matter
which the court considers has minor impact on, or interest for, the public?
206. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
207. Denny, 106 Wis. 2d at 647, 318 N.W.2d at 146 (citing Hutchinson v.
Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979)).
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matter about a private person, and then claiming "public
figure" protection. However, conversely, it would seem clear
that a media defendant should not be penalized because it
was the first to publicize a matter which inherently fits all the
"public controversy" tests. Such a rule would protect only
those who follow up with subsequent stories. If facts exist
which will constitute a public controversy once disclosed and
a person is sufficiently involved in it to qualify as a public
figure, the first news article to be published ought to be
equally protected with later ones.
VI. BURDEN OF PROVING TRUTH OR FALsITY
The defendant's burden to prove the truth of the publication, if the defense of truth is relied on, has existed under a
law which imposed strict liability for defamation (except in
privileged situations). As discussed above, federal cases have
injected a constitutional requirement of "fault" into all defamation actions subject to the rule of those cases - a requirement that the plaintiff must prove the defendant was at fault
regarding the truth or falsity of his statements (the degree of
fault varying, depending on the circumstances, from negligence to actual knowledge of falsity).
A number of courts have either indicated or ruled that if
the plaintiff is a public official or public figure subject to the
New York Times rule, the plaintiff must also prove that the
publication was in fact false, in addition to proving it was
made with malice. 0 8 Should a "private" plaintiff also have the
208. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 499 (1975) (Powell,
J., concurring) (where Justice Powell said: "It is fair to say that if the statements are
true, the standard contemplated by Gertz cannot be satisfied."); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (where the Court noted it had held in New York Times
that a public official could recover "only if he establishes that the utterance was false
and that it was made with [actual malice].

.

.

. "; Rinadi v. Holt, Rinehart & Win-

ston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, -, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1309, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, _, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977) (Breitel, J., concurring) (where the court expressly imposed on a plaintiff judge the burden of proving the falsity of the charges as well as
constitutional malice. The concurring judge concurred "on the constraint of the controlling Supreme Court cases" although he felt they put an undue burden on the
plaintiff, calling it "virtually impossible for a plaintiff to prove, as in the case at bar,
that he is not "corrupt" or "probably corrupt."). See also Simonson v. United Press
Int'l, 500 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (E.D. Wis. 1980) where plaintiff judge had burden of
proving both falsity and malice on the part of the defendant. The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 613 (1977) expresses no opinion as to the extent to which constitu-
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burden of proof regarding falsity? If the plaintiff is subject to
the Gertz minimum constitutional requirements, it is not
clear whether federal constitutional law requires that burden;
if not subject to Gertz, state law would control. In 1981 the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wilson v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,209 a case which squarely
presented the issue as to whether, in a case governed by
Gertz, a private plaintiff had a federal constitutional burden
of proving falsity. The trial court had imposed the burden of
proof on the defendant, verdict was for the plaintiff and defendant appealed. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that
the plaintiff, who had the burden of proving negligence as to
falsity, also had the burden of proving the statements were
false. Unfortunately for determination of the issue, after the
case reached the United States Supreme Court, the writ of
certiorari was dismissed, on stipulation.
In a footnote in Denny v. Mertz,210 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court broadly reaffirmed the law of Wisconsin that a defamation defendant has the burden of proving the defense of truth,
rather than a plaintiff having the burden of proving falsity. It
did so in responding to a contrary holding by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf.1 The Wisconsin court made no distinction in the footnote between McGraw-Hill, the media defendant, to which it applied the Gertz
negligence rule, and Mertz, the "private" defendant, and did
not discuss possible federal constitutional impact on the burden issue.2 12 In Scripps-Howard,the federal court of appeals
had required the private plaintiff who was subject to Gertz to
carry the burden "[a]s a matter of federal First Amendment
law. 21 The federal court observed that in some cases, where
the trier of fact is unable to determine the truth or falsity of a

tional law has affected the common law burden.
209. 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 102 S.Ct. 984
(1981).
210. 106 Wis. 2d at 661 n.35, 318 N.W.2d at 153 n.35.
211. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, -, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976).
212. Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 660-61, 318 N.W.2d 141, 153 (1982). The
footnoted statement is in a portion of the opinion devoted to Mertz, but it is general
in its terms. Whether the court would apply the traditional burden test in suits by
public officials or public figures, or to media defendants in private plaintiff cases, is
not specified.
213. Scripps-Howard,642 F.2d at 376.
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fact, he must render the decision against the one with the burden of proof and that this could permit what is forbidden by
Gertz - a finding of liability on a presumption of fault, without proof of fault.214
VII.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have endeavored to give an over-view of
the defamation law of Wisconsin. Compressing a book-sized
subject into an article has necessarily resulted in omissions of
some subjects, inadequate treatment of others and uneven
emphasis. If the result produces some confusion, the writer
pleads in partial defense the words of Dean Prosser:
[T]here is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes
no sense. It contains anomalies and absurdities for which no
legal writer ever has had a kind word, and it is a curious
compound of a strict liability imposed upon innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found in the law,
with a blind and almost perverse refusal to compensate the
plaintiff for real and very serious harm. The explanation is
in part one of historical accident and survival, in part one of
conflict of opposing ideas of policy in which our traditional
notions of freedom of expression have collided violently with
sympathy for the victim traduced and indignation at the
maligning tongue.21 5

214. Id. at 375.
215. W. PROSSER, supra note 2 at § 111 (footnote omitted).

